Paying Income tax? Part 1
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s definitive Cheek decision, 498 US at page 201, the government in a tax prosecution has a three- fold burden, it must prove:
(1) The law imposed a duty upon the defendant;
(2) The defendant knew of that duty; and (3) he deliberately and intentionally (willfully) violated that duty. Notice that the issue of “willfulness” only enters the picture in connection with the Government’s third burden. Obviously, a defendant has a right during the government’s presentation of its case, to establish that no law imposed any such “duty” upon him. However to do that, the defendant must be able to raise the law itself and show that no law imposed any such “duty’ upon him, and that the IRS employees who testified for the Government, had no legal authority to do what they testified they did.
If the defendant can establish these claims during the Government’s presentation of its case, and knock out all of the Government’s IRS witnesses (which can easily be done by introducing into evidence their job descriptions, the significance of section 7608, and the nature of their “pocket commissions”) the defendant would be entitled to a direct verdict of acquittal at the close of the Government’s presentation of its case, without the defendant even having to put on a defense, largely based on the issue of “willfulness. ”Therefore, how did Judge Dawson prevent me from proving that no income tax law imposed a “duty” upon me, and that I knew of such a “duty” – thereby sparing the government the need of having to prove these first two elements of its burden, while preventing me from proving that none of the Government’s IRS witnesses had any legal authority to do what they testified they did. Judge Dawson sought to accomplished these tasks in a variety of ways.
The first way was to prevent me from bringing up the law itself, by continually claiming that “the law will come from the bench. How could I prove that no “law” imposed any “duty” upon me (and therefore I “knew” of such a “duty”) if I could not bring up the law itself? In fact when I asked Judge Dawson, if the Government intended to put on a witness who would testify that the law imposed a “duty” upon me to pay income taxes, David Ignall, the Government’s lead prosecutor, specifically stated that the Government had no such intention of doing so, but would rely on the Judge Dawson’s jury instructions to establish these elements for the Government. However, since I would never be able to cross-examine Judge Dawson concerning his jury instructions, he would be free to misstate the law (he literally threw all law out the window as he misstated it at least two dozen times – and such examples will follow) as he fabricated a “duty” that did not exist.
Later, at a hearing (conducted outside the presence of the jury) involving his proposed jury instructions, I specifically pointed out to him how numerous of his proposed jury instruction misstated the law - but he gave those instructions anyway, although he did change a few, while he refused to give jury instructions that correctly stated the law. Since my objections and corrections were recorded at that time, they will prove that Judge Dawson knew he was misstating the law to the jury, if my objections are not edited out of the transcript.
Apart from already explaining why the actions of Judge Dawson and the prosecutors constituted criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. 241 in the 12 page motion I filed on July 5, 2005 (and which is posted immediately above this document) their criminal culpability was substantially extended at trial and would now include the crime of obstruction of justice – as the following will demonstrate.
1) Judge Dawson would not allow me to bring up the law, especially when it would impeach the testimony of government witnesses. For example:
a) A government witness, with a very impressive title, was introduced as being in charge of the frivolous penalty program in the 9th Circuit area. She testified that the IRS imposed the $500 frivolous penalty based upon guidelines established by the legal counsel for the IRS, and when the IRS received a tax return that fell within those guidelines, they imposed the $500 frivolous penalty. I objected to her testimony as hearsay, since she was not the one who determined whether a return was frivolous or not, and what she was told by the IRS District Counsel constituted hearsay.
I stated that it was the IRS District Counsel who should be testifying concerning what constituted a “frivolous” return, since he was apparently the one who made that determination and not the witness who was now testifying. But my objection was overruled. When I cross-examined her, I specifically asked her whether or not any IRS agent took specific responsibility for imposing the frivolous penalty. And she again elaborated on how the penalty was imposed pursuant to guidelines set up by the IRS District Counsel. Therefore, I again asked her if she was sure that the frivolous penalty was not imposed by IRS employees taking specific responsibility for imposing the penalty. She said “No,” that was not how it was done. I then asked her if she was familiar with Code section 6751 I forgot whether she said “Yes” or “No.” In any case I asked her, “If you saw a copy of IR Code Section 6751, would that refresh your recollection?” She must have said, “Yes,” since I now moved to admit Section 6751 into evidence.
I handed a copy of section 6751 to the U.S. attorney who was sitting right in back of me. He read it, but appeared to have a puzzled look on his face, when he said, “No objection.” I then handed the document to the clerk, so it could be marked as an Exhibit, and she handed it up to Judge Dawson, who proceeded to read it. He read: “No penalty under this title shall be assessed unless the initial determination of such assessment is personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination or such higher level official as the Secretary may designate.” Judge Dawson, of course, realized that section 6751 (which provided that a document containing at least two signatures was required in order for the frivolous penalty to be imposed) totally impeached the testimony of the Government’s witness then sitting before him. Therefore, he sought to save the government’s witness from being totally discredited by saying: “Well, courts have held (of course, he never named what courts) that this provision is not really binding on the IRS (or words to that effect), so this document is irrelevant and will not be admitted.”
So, Judge Dawson would not allow the law, section 6751, to be admitted, since it would allow me to use it to discredit the entire testimony of this impressively titled, government witness. Since she also stated (in order to establish her alleged credentials, even though the government would not qualify her as an “expert”) that she had testified extensively at both civil and criminal trials. It is, therefore, apparent that at all such trials her testimony was in direct conflict with the law – unfortunately defendants at such trials would probably be unaware of that fact.
b) One of the Government's first witnesses was retired Special Agent Ted Wethje. He is mentioned in the Federal Mafia on pages 221, 222, and 224 . The Government largely relied on his perjured testimony to gain my indictment and conviction in 1985 and therefore sought to use this experienced and unconscionable liar at this trial. He had absolutely no legal authority to testify at either my 1985 trial or at this trial, since he has no more authority to enforce the payment of income taxes than the man in the moon. He is precluded from doing so by his own job description (Exhibit A) and because he falls into subsection (a) of provision 7608 (Exhibit C). Any IRS agent who claims he is legally authorized to carry a firearm must fall into subsection (a) of section 7608, since agents who fall into subsection (b) are not authorized to “carry firearms.” So, if Special Agent Wethje was authorized to “carry firearms” during his employment with the IRS, he could only have been authorized to enforce the payment of liquor, tobacco, and firearms taxes and such other taxes as fall within the provisions of subtitle E of the IR Code – and not income taxes, which fall within subtitle A of the IR Code.
So when I cross-examined him, the first thing I said to him was, “Isn’t it a fact Mr. Wethje, that when you worked at the IRS you carried a firearm?” The government immediately objected to the question (probably citing “relevance”) and its objection was immediately sustained by Judge Dawson in the following manner, “Sustained - move on.” However, I tried to argue that weather or not Wethje carried a firearm was relevant as to whether or not he was authorized to give testimony at this trial since it involved income taxes. However, Judge Dawson would hear none of it. He supposedly had warned me that when he sustained an objection, I was not to argue any further but had to “Move on.” However, I was also under the impression, that one had a right to argue the validity and necessity of the question you asked, before it was ruled upon, and in this case (as well as in numerous other cases) Judge Dawson ruled upon the Government’s objection without giving me an opportunity to argue why the question was relevant to my defense.
Also I am hard of hearing, and so I might not have heard him say “Sustained,” but believed I still had a right to argue the validity of my question – and so might have raised arguments after he had stated “Sustained.” At such times Judge Dawson would bark, “Sanction,” which meant I had just been held in contempt of court, which carried a jail sentence that was double to that meted out by the previous sanction. Judge Dawson started the sanctions at one day in jail, which were then doubled for each succeeding sanction. I must have received at least a dozen sanctions. In any case, he also would not allow me to me bring up Wethje’s job description, which also showed that Wethje had no authority to investigate anybody living within the continental U.S.A. in connection with income taxes, and so he had no authority to be testifying at this trial. In this manner Judge Dawson knowingly allowed the Government to use witnesses against me who he knew had absolutely no authority to testify at my trial.
